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CASE SUMMARIES
CERCLA
United States v. Rohm and Haas Co.,
2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993)
The United States brought suit under
CERCLA § 107,42 U.S.C § 9607 (1988),
against defendants Rohm and Haas Com-
pany ("R & H"), the Bristol Township Au-
thority ("BTA"), Chemical Properties ("CP")
and Rohm and Haas, Delaware Valley, Inc.
("R & H-DVI") to recover costs incurred by
the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") related to the cleanup of a 120 acre
landfill in Bristol Township, Pennsylvania.
The cleanup was conducted pursuant to an
Administrative Consent Order issued under§ 3008(h) of the Resource Conservation and
RecoveryAct("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C§6928(h)
(1988) which held R & H-DVI solely respon-
sible for the site's cleanup. The agreement
did not include a provision enabling the
government to recoup its implementation
expenses. R & H-DVI, under EPA supervi-
sion, complied with the order and continues
to fulfill it's obligations. The government
initiated this action seeking recovery for its
response costs. The defendants argued that
they were not liable under the Comprehen-
sive Environmnetal Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act ("CERCIA") § 107 for
any costs specifically related to the EPA
oversight.
The EPA can bring actions to require
removal or remediation pursuant to § 104(a)
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988),
where hazardous substances have been re-
leased or threaten to be released. Section
107 mandates that the responsible parties
bear the cost of such actions. The EPA
contended that the defendants were liable
under § 107 for its oversight costs since
oversight of a RCRA corrective action is
equivalent to a CERCLA "removal" action.
The defendants countered that because
RCRA and CERCLA are two discrete statu-
tory schemes, and RCRA itself does not
authorize the EPA to seek reimbursement
for supervisory costs incurred under RCRA,
such costs are not recoverable.
The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that § 107 of CERCLA pre-
empts any conflicting or companion legisla-
tive schemes and thus, if an action qualifies
as a "removal" action, CERCLA imposes
liability on the responsible parties, regardless
of what statutory tool the EPA utilized in
effecting such action. Given this conclusion,
the court reasoned that the determinative
issue was whether the CERCIA definition of
removal included expenses associated with
government oversight of removal actions
sponsored and conducted solely by private
parties.
The court held that the governmental
agencies could only recover their administra-
tive costs, including costs incurred in a super-
visory capacity, from those they regulate if
the applicable statutory language explicitly
reflected Congress' clear intention to del-
egate this authority to the agency in ques-
tion. In ruling that the EPA had no such
authority, the court relied primarily on
CERCLA's lack of reference to governmen-
tal oversight of activities financed and con-
ducted by private parties. Also, the court
noted that § 104 of CERCLA was further
indicative of Congressional intent to with-
hold this authority from the EPA because it
allows the EPA to delegate the responsibility
for numerous removal and remedial under-
takings to private parties, yet only addresses
the recovery of supervisory costs in regard to
remedial investigations and feasibility studies
("RI/FS").
The Court of Appeals held that only
direct action taken by the government in the
form of investigation, evaluation, or observa-
tion of a release or threatened release consti-
tuted a recompensable "removal" under
CERCLA. The court then remanded to the
district court to determine which costs the
EPA can recoup.
Defendant Chemical Properties con-
tended that it should not be held jointly and
severally liable because it owns only a small
fraction of the offending site and because it
did not actually dispose of any hazardous
wastes atthe site. Thecourtheldthatthough
the language of CERCLA § 107 apparently
imposes liability on only "the owner" of a
site, common sense requires that this phrase
be interpreted as "any owner," else property
held by multiple owners escape the reach of
CERCLA.
The court further held that imposing
joint and several liability on the owner of a
comparatively small share of a jointly-titled
parcel of real estate would be inequitable in
some circumstances. Damages can be ap-
portioned where one harm can reasonably
be attributed to separate causes. CP failed to
prove that it was in no way responsible for
any of the contamination and accordingly did
not carry its burden.
The court noted that though CP was
jointly and severally liable for EPA's costs,
the less than 10% ownership of the site could
be an "equitable factor" in subsequent con-
tribution actions brought by CP against the
other defendants.
- by Thad R. Mulholland
In re Cropwell Leasing Co. v. NMS,
Inc., 5 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1993)
On January 26, 1992, a barge in tow of
the M/V Scaup and a barge in the tow of the
M/V De Lasalle, NMS 1905, collided at the
intersection of the Intercostal Waterway and
the Wax Lake Outlet in Louisiana. The NMS
1905wasdamagedandconsequentlyspewed
approximately 100,000 gallons of the haz-
ardous substance styrene into the Intercostal
Waterway.
Following the collision, the owner and
lessee of the M/V Scaup, ("Dravo"), along
with the owner and lessee of the M/V de
Lasalle, invoked the shipowner's Limitation
of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 183, et seq. in
an attempt to limit their liability arising from
the spill. The government intervened in
Dravo's limitation proceeding and sought
damages and removal costs under CERCLA,
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("FWCPA"), and general maritime common
law. The district court granted the
government's request for voluntary dismissal
of its FWCPA claims, granted summary
judgment for Dravo on the government's
CERCLA claims and dismissed the
government's common law claims. The
government appealed the dismissal of the
common law claims.
The district court held that no such
claim can be made because the CERCLA
saving clause, 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1988),
does not specifically preserve the right of the
government to institute a general maritime
claim against a non-discharging vessel. The
Court of Appeals of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit disagreed, holding that the CERCLA
saving clause preserves state, federal, or
common law remedies the government may
seek in addition to a CERCLA action. Hold-
ing that the govemment's maritime common
law claims constitute a federal law remedy
preserved by CERCLA's saving clause, the
court of appeals vacated the district court
decision and remanded the case.
- by Thad R. Mulholland
In re Bell Petroleum Serus., Inc. , 3
F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993)
Sequa Corporation ("Sequa) appealed
a district court judgment imposing joint and
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several liability upon it for response costs the
EPA incurred to remedy chromium waste
which caused groundwater contamination.
John Leigh, Western Pollution Control Cor-
poration ("Bell"), and Woolley Tool Division
of Chromalloy American corporation (which
later merged with Sequa) all operated a
chrome-plating shop near Odessa, Texas,
from 1971 through 1977. Leigh operated
the facilities from 1971 to 1972, Bell from
1972 to 1976, and Sequa during 1976 and
1977.
In 1984, the EPA designated a 24-
block area with discolored drinking water as
a Superfund site, authorizing response ac-
tion under CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. §
9604. A detailed study revealed the sole
source of groundwater for the area con-
tained elevated chromium concentrations,
and on September 8, 1986, the City of
Odessa water system was ordered to supply
the area under a Record of Decision ("ROD")
by the EPA Regional Administrator.
The EPA filed a CERCLA cost-recov-
ery action against Bell, Sequa, and John
Leigh. The district court ordered a three-
phase case: Phase I to determine liability,
Phase II to address recoverability of the
EPA's response costs, and Phase III to exam-
ine responsibility. In Phase I, the district
court found the defendants jointly and sever-
ally liable for past and future response costs.
The district court in Phase II found the EPA's
direct and indirect response costs from pro-
viding an alternate water supply ("AWS") to
be recoverable, as well as prejudgment inter-
est from the date such costs were incurred.
In June 1990, the district court held
that the evidence presented no method,
besides mere speculation, of apportioning
the defendant's liability. Using equitable
factors, the court concluded that Bell was
responsible for 30 percent, Sequa for 35
percent, and Leigh for 35 percent. After the
EPA obtained consent decrees settling any
and all liabilities of Bell and Leigh, for
$1,000,000 and $100,000, respectively,
Sequa was held jointly and severally liable for
$1,866,904, plus any future response costs.
Sequa appealed. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals issued a five-part holding.
In its first two parts, the court held that
defendants seeking to avoid joint and several
liability under CERCLA were required to
prove the amount of harm that they caused.
The court found that Sequa had met its
burden of proving a reasonable basis for
apportioning liability among the defendants
on a volumetric basis. The court's authority
came from the Restatement of Torts, which
states that whether apportionment among
two or more causes is possible constitutes a
question of law, not fact.
In making these two determinations,
the court discussed three theories of appor-
tionment: (1) the "Chem-Dyne approach,"
or Restatement approach, requiring proof of
amount of harm caused by the defendant
seeking to escape joint and several liability;
(2) the "Alcan approach," followed in the
Second and Third Circuits, which allows the
defendants to altogether avoid liability upon
a showing that the defendants' waste did not
cause them to incur response costs; and (3)
the "moderate" approach which applies
Restatement principles in determining a rea-
sonable basis for apportionment, but also
allows the court discretion to refuse to im-
pose joint and several liability where equi-
table factors suggest otherwise. The court
adopted the Chem-Dyne approach. As
Sequa provided evidence showing that the,
three parties whose operations resulted in
chromium entering the groundwater existed
at mutually exclusive times, the court re-
manded the case for a determination of
apportionment on a volumetric basis.
In the third part of the court's holding,
the court concluded that the EPA's decision
to provide an AWS was arbitrary and capri-
cious under 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(2). This
conclusion was based on evidence that no
attempt was made to determine whether
anyone actually drank the water prior to
making the decision, that the AWS did not
reduce any public health threat, and that the
AWS was a waste of Superfund money.
In the fourth part of the court's holding,
the court found that because the EPA arbi-
trarily and capriciously implemented the
AWS, the costs associated with the AWS
were not recoverable under CERCLA be-
cause they were inconsistent with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan.
In the fifth and final part of the holding,
the court stated that the EPA's filing of a
complaint was sufficient for meeting the
written notice requirement for specified re-
sponse costs as a prerequisite to awarding
prejudgment interest. Because the court had
previously concluded thatthe EPA's response
costs were not recoverable, however, it also
vacated the district court's decision to award
prejudgment interest. The court held that to
the extent that the EPA was found to have
recoverable costs, interest on such costs
should be calculated from the date of the
complaint (for costs incurred before the com-
plaint) and from the date the costs were
incurred (for other costs).
- by Mark A. Meyer
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO
Inc., 6 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1993)
The plaintiff, Louisiana-Pacific Corpo-
ration ("Louisiana-Pacific") sued ASARCO
Incorporated ("ASARCO") under CERCLA,
the Washington Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Act, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§
70.105.005 et seq. ("West 1992") and the
Washington Products LabilityAct("WPIA"),
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 7.72010 et seq.
(West 1992) for cleanup costs for slag con-
tamination and for contribution or indem-
nity. ASARCO counterclaimedagainstLoui-
slana-Pacific under CERCLA and state law.
ASARCO had been smelting copper
from copper ore near Tacoma. The process
produced the byproduct slag. ASARCO had
sold the slag to various log yards beginning in
1973. Several years later, the EPA and the
Washington Department of Ecology
("WDOE") determined that the slag had
contaminated water runoffs from the log
yards and ordered a cleanup of the site.
Louisiana-Pacific owned one of the log yards
which was contaminated by the slag.
The District Court for the Western
District of Washington held ASARCO liable
under CERCLA for 79-100% of the cleanup
costs and for 75-100% of the cleanup costs
under Washington state law. In addition the
court found ASARCO liable for attorneys
fees and costs under both state and federal
law, subject to reduction based on compara-
tive fault.
Upon appeal by ASARCO, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined
ASARCO's liability for cleanup costs under
CERCLA. The court found the slag to be a
hazardous substance under CERCLA even
though slag is specifically exempted under
the Bevill Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14)(C) (1988). The court reasoned
that even though the Bevill Amendment
excludes slag, the exclusion applies only to
that particular subsection. Slag contains
components such as copper, lead, arsenic
and zinc, which are considered hazardous
under the Bevill Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §
9601 (14)(A),(B) and (D) (1988). The court
decided that slag may still be considered a
hazardous substance under any other sub-
section under the statute and may be re-
51IM E L PR I
Vol. 2 * No. 1
garded as a hazardous substance under
CERCLA.
The court also looked at whether slag
could be both a "product" under the WPLA
and "waste disposal" under CERCLA. The
court held that while slag may be considered
a product that can be sold and has value, it
may also be characterized as waste disposal
under CERCLA in order to comport with the
broad purposes of the statute. The court
noted that the jury's finding on the trial level
that slag was a product did not preclude the
court from finding it also to be waste dis-
posal.
The courtaddressed whetherASARCO
should be responsible for cleanup costs at
one of the contaminations sites if the cleanup
did not comply with the notice and comment
provisions of the National Contingency Plan
("NCP"), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
The court held that substantial, rather than
perfect compliance was required, and that
the meetings held regarding the cleanup of
that site substantially complied with the NCP.
The court next examined ASARCO's
liability under several Washington state law
claims. The first issue raised was ASARCO's
liability for attomeys' fees and prejudgment
interest awarded to the plaintiffs by the
district court under Washington's Hazardous
Waste Management Act ("HWMA") which
was amended to provide a private cause of
action. In reversing the district court deci-
sion, the appellate court noted that the
amendment was not yet in effect when
ASARCO sold its slag to Louisiana-Pacific.
The amendment could not be applied retro-
actively; consequently, the court found
ASARCO not to be liable for attorney fees
and prejudgment interests associated with its
slag sales before the amendment took effect
The court then looked to the district
court's award of damages under the WPLA
for Louisiana-Pacific's lost use of its log yard
due to the slag contamination. The court
stated that the WPLA does not allow for
recovery for lost use.
- by V. Alyse Hakami
FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of
Commerce, 1993 WL 489133 (3d Cir.
1993)
The United States and the United States
Department of Commerce appealed from a
judgment entered against them which held
the United States was jointly and severally
liable, as an "owner," "operator," and "ar-
ranger" of a facility at which FMC is respon-
sible for cleanup under CERCLA.
FMC purchased the Front Royal, Vir-
ginia facility from American Viscose in 1963.
American Viscose began manufacturing tex-
tile rayon at the facility in 1940. After the
Pearl Harbor attack, the government deter-
mined that it needed more high tenacity
rayon to make up for the lack of rubber in
airplane and truck tires.
The Work Production Board ("WPB"),
which was established in 1942, issued direc-
tives to industry in connection with war
procurement and production and also was
empowered to seize and operate non-com-
plying industries. The WPB required Ameri-
can Viscose to convert the Front Royal plant
to enable it to produce high tenacity rayon.
Because the govemment considered this a
war plant, it was subject to the government's
maximum control.
The govenment leased and govern-
ment owned equipment and machinery for
use at the facility and contracted with an-
other company to design and install the
equipment at the facility. In October 1942,
the govemment obtained draft deferments
for personnel, brought in additional workers
and supplied housing for them at the Front
Royal facility. The government was active in
every phase of labor at the facility, including
management, worker supervision, and in-
vestigation and resolution of problems.
Production of the high tenacity rayon
resulted in viscose waste which was disposed
of in large unlined basins located on site.
From 1942 through 1945, at least 65,500
cubic yards of viscose waste were placed in
the on-site bins.
The 1982 inspection of the plant re-
vealed carbon disulfide in the groundwater
surrounding the plant. The EPA began
cleanup operations and notified FMC of its
potential liability. FMC filed suit in 1990
against the Department of Commerce under
§ 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)
(1988) alleging that as a result of the
government's activities during World War II,
that the United States became jointly liable
with FMC as an "owner" and "operator" of
the facility and as an "arranger" for disposal
of hazardous wastes there.
The district court concluded that the
government was an owner and operator of
the facility and an arranger of waste disposal.
The parties settled the allocation of liability,
subject to the government's appeal of the
ruling holding it liable as an operator and
arranger. The government conceded its
liability as an owner and was allocated 8% of
the cleanup costs. The court found the gov-
ernment to be an operator as its conduct was
similar to that of a private, commercial party
in that its regulation was in furtherance of its
commercial goals and thus had substantial
control over the day-to-day operations of the
facility.
The court found the government to be
an arranger through applying a three-part
test: [Arranger liability may be imposed on
an entity who (1) supplied raw materials to
another and (2) owned or controlled the
work done at the site, where (3) the genera-
tion of hazardous substances was inherent in
the production process. Application of those
factors resulted in a finding that the govem-
mentwas indeed an arranger under CERCLA.
The Court of Appeals for the Third
Or uit upheld the government's liability as
an operator and arranger and its total liability
under the settlement agreement was in-
creased to 26% of the cleanup costs. The
court rejected the government's argument
for sovereign immunity under CERCLA
§ 120(a)(1). The court also determined that
the "regulatory" exception suggested by the
govemmentwouldundermineCongressional
intent
- by Christine Hymes
Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Alumi-
num Corp., 5 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 1993)
Consolidated Aluminum Corporation
("Conalco") appealed a ruling that granted
Olin Corp.'s ("Olin") motion for partial sum-
mary judgment, denied Conalco's motion
for partial summary judgment and dismissed
with prejudice Conalco's first claim for relief
in its counterclaim which was based on
CERCLA.
The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit addressed the interpretation of the
indemnity and release provisions contained
in agreements between the two parties.
Conalco claimed that these provisions which
predated CERCLA were insufficient to re-
lieve Olin of its liability under CERCLA.
In 1974, Conalco bought Olin's alumi-
num business in Hannibal, Ohio, and agreed
to indemnify Olin for "all liabilities (absolute
or contingent), obligations and indebtedness
of Olin" related to the assets purchased. In
1972, Olin had learned that its byproducts
containedpolychlorinatedbiphenyls("PCBs")
and began to dispose of the toxins properly.
Olin did not, however, take any action to
eliminate contaminants from the impound-
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ment pool it had previously used to dispose
the PCB's.
In 1986 the Ohio Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("Ohio EPA") concluded that
the pool and the surrounding soil were con-
taminated with PCBs and ordered
remediation of this hazard. Conalco com-
plied and sought voluntary contribution from
Olin, which Olin refused. Olin then filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking a deter-
mination that Conalco was liable to Olin for
the costs of defending suits against it regard-
ing their former aluminum business.
Conalco's counterclaim, based upon
CERCLA, included two claims: the first claim
sought reimbursement for $991,359.91 it
allegedly spent cleaning up the Hannibal site
and the second was a declaratory judgment
declaring Olin liable for claims related in any
way to the PCB's at the Hannibal site and
also at the site of Eastern Diversified Metals
in Hometown, Pennsylvania. Both parties
subsequently filed cross-motions for partial
summary judgment.
The court concluded that CERCLA
permits private parties to contract with re-
spect to indemnification and contribution for
environmental liability. The court further
concluded that the indemnification and re-
lease agreements that Olin and Conalco had
entered into were clear, valid and enforce-
able. The court denied Conalco's motion for
partial summary judgment, granted Olin's
partial summary judgment and dismissed
with prejudice Conalco's CERCLA counter-
claim.
The appellate court agreed with the
district court's decision regarding interpreta-
tion of the agreements. The appellate court
directed the district court to amend the
judgment to provide that the claims in
Conalco's CERCLA counterclaim dealing
with third party sites, other than the Pennsyl-
vania site, were to be dismissed without
prejudice based on the fact that the agree-
ments were entered into prior to any knowl-
edge of CERCLA and Conalco should be
able to bring other claims against Olin as a
result of Olin's disposal of hazardous wastes
on properties later sold to Conalco. As to the
Pennsylvania site, the appellate court ruled
that it had no authority to make findings of
fact and remanded the claim for the district
court to make findings and then rule on
Conalco's CERCLA claim as it pertains to
that site.
- by Christine Hymes
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841
F.Supp. 962 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
The United States and California
brought suit under the CERCLA for cleanup
costs of a contaminated site in Fullerton,
California ("McColl site"). The defendants
include four oil companies and McAuley
LCX Corporation ("McAuley").
The McColl site is 22 acres and con-
tains six pits, or sumps. The site became
contaminated in World War II with acid
sludge byproducts of alkylation processes
used to produce high octane aviation fuel.
During the war, the federal government
required all oil companies to produce high
octane aviation fuel. Companies that did not
comply were subject to government take-
over.
The defendant oil companies voluntar-
ily entered into lucrative contracts with the
government. The acid sludge that they
produced was disposed of in the unlined
sumps at the McColl site during World War
I. McColl and the oil companies covered the
sumps at the request of the City of Fullerton.
A country club and golf course were later
built over part of the McCall site. McAuley
purchased the club in 1980 with knowledge
of the underlying sumps.
Since 1980, acid sludge had been ooz-
ing to the ground surface, causing an esti-
mated 10,000 cubic yards of soil to become
contaminated. Pursuant to § 107 of
CERCLA, the governments must prove that
due to the release of a hazardous substance
at a facility, they have incurred response
costs. The court found all elements to be
satisfied by the govemments and imposed
liability on the defendants for owning the
facility and for arranging for disposal of the
sludge.
The court rejected all defenses, includ-
ing act of war defense at 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b)(2) (1988). The defendants asserted
that they dumped the acid sludge at the
McColl site only because the govemment
required them to produce so much aviation
fuel that they had no alternative means of
disposing the waste products. The court
sought to determine Congressional intent
behind the phrase "act of war." The court
could find no explanation for the term and
emphasized the general Congressional in-
tent to impose strict liability for CERCLA
cleanups. Despite government regulation of
the oil companies fuel production in World
War II, the court rejected the application of
§ 9607(b)(2) (1988) based on the fact that the
defendants had voluntarily entered into fuel
production contracts with the government
and were compensated.
Defendants also asserted that the acid
sludge contamination was an act of third
parties, namely the act of United States,
Japanese and German governments in World
War I. The court rejected this defense, again
referring to the volitional contracts entered
into between the oil companies and the
United States.
McAuley raised theinnocent landowner
defense of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988),
that it did not know or have reason to know
of the release of hazardous substances. The
court found that McAuley had known of the
sumps when it purchased the property and
rejected McAuley's defense.
The defendants also attacked the retro-
active application of CERCLA as being un-
constitutional under the Due Process and
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The court could find no basis to distinguish
this case from others which had retroactively
applied CERCLA. In addition, it found
Congressional intent to compel cleanup of
past careless waste disposal tactics and
thereby rejected the defense.
- by Christine Hymes
Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. ENENCO,
Inc.,1993 WL 462512 (6th Cir. 1993)
Velsicol Chemical Corporation
("Velsicol") appealed their liability for
CERCLA response costs, arguing that the
statute of limitations for a claim under
CERCLA § 107 should be applied retroac-
tively and that laches is available for a § 107
claim. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the statute of limitations
should not apply retroactivelyand that laches
was unavailable.
Velsicol's claim accrued in 1981 though
it did not file its claim until 1988. In October
of 1986, Congress added a statute of limita-
tionsto§ 107(a) of CERCLAintheSuperfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA"), setting a limit of three years after
the completion of a remedial action or six
years after initiation of construction on a
remedial action for bringing suit for recovery
of response costs. The court found that the
statute of limitations did not apply to Velsicol's
claims. It relied on the fact that there had
been no statute of limitations prior to the
1986 amendment and the established pre-
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sumption that a new congressional enact-
ment will not be construed to apply retroac-
tively unless specifically stated. Velsicol,
therefore, had at least three years from the
enactment of the statute of limitations to file
suit.
The court also found that the defense of
laches did not bar Velsicol's claims. It noted
that § 107 specifically states three defenses
to this type of claim: an act of God, an act of
war and an act or omission of a third party
other than an employee or agent of the
defendant. The court determined that Con-
gress specifically limited CERCLA defenses
to the three stated.
- by Anemarie Mura
WATER
United States v. Plaza Health Labs.,
Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993)
DefendantGeronimoVillegas, co-owner
and Vice President of Plaza Health Labora-
tories, was convicted in district court for
violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by
knowingly discharging pollutants into navi-
gable waters. Villegas appealed, claiming
that he was not a "point source" as defined
under the act. Plaza Health Laboratories,
Inc. is a blood-testing laboratory in Brooklyn,
New York. On at least two occasions,
Villegas loaded containers or vials of human
blood from his business into his car, carried
them to his condominium at the edge of the
Hudson River and disposed them in the
water. The vials later washed ashore. A
group of children found some vials; mainte-
nance workers found others. Cleanup crews
retrieved the vials, some of which contained
blood contaminated with hepatitis-B.
Villegas was charged with knowingly
discharging pollutants from a "point source"
without a permit. Villegas argued on appeal
that the reading of a human being as a "point
source" was ambiguous. Villegas argued
that the rule of lenity should apply, so that
any ambiguities in a statute be resolved in the
defendant's favor.
The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit looked to the definition of "point
source" contained in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
(1988). It found that the definition evoked
images of physical structures and instrumen-
talities that convey pollutants from an indus-
trial source to waterways. The court also
examined the purpose of the CWA to dis-
courage pollution. The court found that the
CWA's legislative history and regulatory struc-
ture as well as case law suggested that human
beings were not to be included in the defini-
tion of "point source." The court, therefore,
found that the rule of lenity should apply and
reversed the defendant's conviction for dis-
charging pollutants in violation of the CWA.
- by Anemorie Mura
James City County v. United States
Envtl. Protection Agency, 1993 WL
539821 (4th Cir. 1993)
Plaintiff-Appellee James City County,
Virginia ("the County"), was granted a per-
mit under § 404(b) of the CWA by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps")
in 1988 to build a dam and reservoir at Ware
Creek. Defendant-Appellant EPA vetoed
the permit pursuant to § 404(c) of the CWA.
The County filed suit in district court and
moved for summary judgment. The court
granted summary judgment and ordered the
Corps to issue the permit. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
upheld the district court's ruling that there
was not substantial evidence to support the
EPA's finding of the existence of practicable
alternatives to the Ware Creek Reservoir.
The Fourth Circuit, however, remanded the
case to the EPA in order to permit the EPA
to determine if solely environmental consid-
erations supported the veto.
The EPA determined that environmen-
tal considerations alone provided a sufficient
basis for its veto, and once again the County
responded by filing suit in district court. The
district court granted the County's motion
forsummary judgment, holding that the EPA
did not have authority to base its veto on
environmental considerations alone, and al-
tematively that there was insufficient evi-
dence to wanant the EPA's finding of unac-
ceptable adverse environmental effects. The
EPA appealed.
The Fourth Circuit held that the EPA
did have the authority to basea § 404(c) veto
on environmental considerations alone. The
County argued that the EPA must consider a
community's water needs before vetoing a
project. The court pointed out that Con-
gress intended the Corps to consider the full
range of factors when deciding to issue a
permit. The court held that Congress gave
the EPA the final decision in this process and
invested it with unquestionable authority to
veto a project to. protect the environment.
The court recognized that this is a broad
grant of power, but that a primary mission of
the EPA is to assure clean water. The court
held that a veto based solely on environmen-
tal considerations was justified since the
EPA's function under the CWA is to assure
the purity of water, not its availability.
The court tumed next to the sufficiency
of evidence supporting the EPA's finding of
unacceptable adverse environmental effects.
It held that the EPA's findings in the admin-
istrative record were not arbitrary and capri-
cious and were supported by substantial
evidence. The court pointed to the adminis-
trative record, in which the EPA had enumer-
ated the loss of 381 acres of vegetated
wetlands, 44 acres of palustrine, estuarine,
or lacustrine open water systems, and 792
acres of adjacent forested uplands habitat.
The EPA predicted that cumulative damage
to the ecosystem from the loss of these
wet'ands would stretch to the Chesapeake
Bay. The EPA also pointed to the harm or
eventual loss of various fish and wildlife
species, including a valuable Great Blue
Heron rookery. Furthermore, the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the district court had not
given proper deference to the EPA's finding
that the County's mitigation plan was inad-
equate to offset the loss of specific types of
wetlands habitats.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the deci-
sion of the district court, finding that the EPA
did have authority under § 404(c) of the
CWA to veto the Ware Creek Reservoir
project solely on the basis of environmental
considerations and that the EPA's findings
on these considerations were sufficient to
support its veto.
- by Theodore A. Kardis
Rueth v. United States Envtl. Protec-
tion Agency, 1993 WL 540816 (7th Cir.
1993)
Plaintiff-appellant Harold G. Rueth, d/
b/a Rueth Development Company, Inc.
("Rueth") was notified on January 22, 1991
by Defendant-appellant Army Corps of En-
gineers ("Corps") that he had failed to obtain
apermitfordischarging dredge and fill materi-
als into wetlands and that such discharges
were unauthorized. Rueth asked the Corps
for identification of the discharge areas.
Defendant-appellant EPA, which also has
jurisdiction to enforce the CWA, issued Rueth
a compliance order under § 309(a) of the
CWA on April 11, 1991. The order, which
contained the EPA's findings, also ordered
Rueth to stop discharging into the wetlands
and to begin restoring them. Rueth then
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sought a nationwide permit from the Corps
to authorize the previous filling. The Corps
denied the permit based on its finding that
Rueth was trying to circumvent a review of
the environmental impact of its development
plans by seeking review in "piecemeal" fash-
ion.
Rueth filed suit in federal district court
for both injunctive relief and a declaratory
judgment. The govemment filed a motion to
dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and the district court granted the mo-
tion. Rueth appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the intent of Congress when
it enacted the CWA was to allow judicial
review of administrative agency decisions
only after the agency sought judicial enforce-
ment of a compliance order or the enforce-
ment of administrative penalties. Rueth
claimed not to be challenging the compli-
ance order, but rather the government's
jurisdiction over the wetlands in its develop-
ment project. The court found no merit in
this argument, responding that challenging
the existence of the EPA's jurisdiction was
indistinguishable from challenging its extent
The court instructed Rueth that the
district court would not have subject matter
jurisdiction until there is an EPA finding that
Rueth's property is a wetland under the
CWA and the EPA seeks enforcement of
penalties against Rueth. While admitting
that its ruling could potentially cause prob-
lems for Rueth in the interim, the court
admonished the developer for failing to seek
the proper permits mandated by the CWA
prior to filling the wetlands. Although Kueth
maintained that it was unaware the area was
a wetland constituting "waters of the United
States" under the CWA, the court noted that
nearly all wetlands are encompassed by the
far-reaching definitions of the CWA. The
court asserted its ability to intervene in pre-
enforcement activity where either the EPA
or the Corps oversteps the bounds of their
authority, but stated that this was not such an
instance.
Next, the court responded to an argu-
ment by Rueth that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ("APA") gave it jurisdiction. The
court held that the APA does not allow
judicial review since the CWA precludes it
Finally, Rueth attempted to persuade the
court that it had jurisdiction under the De-
daratoryJudgmentsAct, butthecourt pointed
out that the act is not an independent grant
of jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction must have
a statutory basis, the Court rejected Rueth's
argument by returning to its central holding
that it lacked jurisdiction under the CWA and
affirmed the decision of the district court.
- by Theodore A. Kardis
Committee to Save Mokelumne River
v. EastBay Municipal Util. Dist., 1993
WL 535692 (9th Cir. 1993)
The East Bay Municipal District ("Dis-
trict") and the members of the California
Regional Water Quality Control Board, Cen-
tral Valley Region, appealed from a district
court's order holding them liable for violating
the CWA. The plaintiffs, Committee to Save
MokelumneRiver("Committee") alleged that
the District owned and operated the Penn
Mine facility and that the facility, was dis-
charging pollutants into the Camanche Res-
ervoir and Mokelumne River without a per-
mit, in violation of the CWA. The district
court found in favor of the Committee.
ThePennMinepropertyisthesiteof an
abandoned copper and zinc mine. The
companies that mined the site until the
1950's left behind reactive mine tailings,
waste rock and excavated ores. These ma-
terials form "acid mine drainage" when ex-
posed to oxygen and water. "Acid mine
drainage" contains high concentrations of
aluminum, cadmium, copper, zinc, iron and
sulfuric acid. Unless preventative measures
are taken, the runoff from the acid mine
drainageintonnoff flowsintotheMokelumne
River.
In the 1960's, theDistrict acquired part
of the Penn Mine property to build the
Camanche Reservoir. The District owns
water rights on the Mokelumne River and
supplies water to east San Francisco. In
1978, the District built the Penn Mine Facil-
ity to reduce the toxic runoff. Occasionally,
however, the polluted water and drainage
from the District's facility spilled over into the
Mokelumne River and Camanche Reservoir.
That spillage caused the Committee to sue
the District under the "citizen suit" provi-
sions of the CWA.
The Committee sought a judgment de-
claring the District liable for discharging the
pollutants without a permit. The Committee
also wanted the District enjoined from dis-
charging pollutants until it obtained a proper
permit under the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System ("NPDES").
The district court found that the District
was discharging pollutants into the Camanche
Reservoir and Mokelumne River without a
permit in violation of the CWA. Based on
this finding, the court partially granted the
Committee's motion for summary judgment
on the issue of liability.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit looked at four issues. First, the
appellate court determined whether the
District's facility was violating the CWA's
permit requirements. The five elements
required for proof of a permit violation
include showing that defendants: 1) dis-
charged, or added 2) a pollutant 3) to navi-
gable waters 4) from 5) a point source. The
main issue in the instant case is whether the
District was responsible for discharging or
adding pollutants. The District admitted to
the other four elements. The appellate court
held that the district was adding pollution
through the polluted surface runoff that came
from the minesite. Consequently, the court
found the District to be subject to the CWA's
pennit requirements.
Second, the District contended that it
had raised an issue of material fact at trial so
as to preclude a summary judgment against
it. The appellate court held that it had not
The District stated that whether it was still
liable under the CWA when the level of
contaminants in the river was not increased
by the pollutants discharged into the
Mokelumne was a material issue that should
have precluded summary judgment The
court held that the permit violation took
place regardless of the level of pollution. The
District, therefore, had failed to raise a mate-
rial issue, and summary judgment was proper.
Third, the court examined whether regu-
latory actions taken by a state to prevent or
reduce pollution were subject to the CWA's
permit requirements. 'The court held that no
exemptions from the permit requirement
existed for state actions to prevent or reduce
discharge of pollutants. As a result, the
District could not escape liability simply be-
cause it was a state agency.
Finally, the court discussed whether the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution protected the Water Board, a
defendant in this action, from liability under
the CWA. The court held that the Eleventh
Amendment did not protect against claims
seeking prospective equitable relief. Be-
cause equitable relief was the nature of the
Committee's claim, it was not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
The appellate court concluded that the
district court had properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the Committee on the
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issue of defendant's liability under the CWA.
- by Kimberly Bettisworth
Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Texaco Refining and Market-
ing, Inc., 2 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 1993)
Environmental groups, including Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("NRDC")
brought a citizen suit under the CWA alleging
violations of a NPDES discharge permit by a
Texaco refinery.
In 1988, Texaco was discharging pol-
lutants into the Delaware River pursuant to
an NPDES permit. Texaco's permit set up
seven monitoring points, or outfalls, through
which pollutants could be discharged. Each
outfall contained a specific parameter, mean-
ing a specific attribute of a discharge. The
parameters were subject to strict effluent
limitations. Texaco's permit required it to
sample every parameter at every outfall at
prescribed intervals and to report the results
monthly. Star Enterprise ("Star"), a Texaco
subsidiary, acquired the Texaco refinery in
1988. A new NPDES permit was issued to
Star in 1989.
The trial court had granted NRDC's
motion for summary judgment on the issue
of Texaco's liability and thereby foundTexaco
liable for alleged permit violations. The court
also enjoined Texaco from future violations
of the 1989 permit Texaco filed an inter-
locutory appeal. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit vacated the injunction and
remanded the case to the district court. On
remand, the district court allowed NRDC to
give additional evidence of its standing. The
court found that NRDC presented sufficient
evidence of standing and concluded that
Texaco had exceeded its NPDES permit
effluent limitations 414 times betweenMarch
1983 and February 1991. The court, how-
ever, determined that it had jurisdiction only
over continuous and intermittent violations
and not over wholly past violations. Of the
414 violations, the district court found that
365 were continuous or intermittent and 49
were wholly past. The court imposed a civil
penalty of $500 per day of violation, which
totalled $1,680,000. The court again en-
joined further violations of the 1989 permit
Texacoappealed and NRDCcross-appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit first examined its subject matter juris-
diction. On cross-appeal, NRDC alleged that
the district court had erred by failing to
exercise jurisdiction over 49 violations that
occurred prior to the filing of NRDC's com-
plaint. The court sought to determine the
proper standard for determining the extent
of a court's subject matter jurisdiction over
cases in which there are a series of permit
violations involving multipleparameters. The
NRDC argued that the court should use a
"permit-based" standard, under which juris-
diction attaches to entire cases, not to indi-
vidual violations within the case. The court
found this standard overbroad.
Texaco urged the court to use a "pa-
rameter-based" standard, under which the
court looks at each violation separately and
exercises jurisdiction only over continuous
or intermittent violations as of the time of the
complaint. The court found this standard to
be too narrow in that one flaw in the treat-
ment process could often lead to violations of
several parameters.
The court chose use a "modified by
parameter standard." Under this standard
the plaintiff could establish at trial that viola-
tions were continuous or intermittent either
by proving the likelihood of a violation of the
same parameter, or by proving a likelihood
that the same source of trouble would cause
violations of different parameters.
Texaco also argued that the district
court erred in holding that post-complaint
violations of a parameter were dispositive
proof ofpre-complaintviolations. The court
had found that 42 parameter violations had
occurred after the filing of the complaint and
323 had occurred prior to the complaint's
filing, but were continuous or intermittent
when the complaint was filed. The appellate
court held that plaintiff need not prove both
that a post-complaint violation had occurred
and that independent evidence proves a
likelihood that violations would recur. Either
method of proof was enough to prove that
pre-complaint violations were continuous or
intermittent.
Texaco next argued that the district
courtshould have dismissed manyof NRDC's
claims for penalties on mootness grounds.
Texaco argued that the 1989 permit relaxed
many of the parameters enough to eliminate
any possibility of future violations. The court
found that injunctive remedies with respect
to the relaxed parameters were moot, but
civil penalties were not The court noted that
a citizen suit would not be effective if a
defendant could avoid paying penalties by
post-complaint compliance with its permit
Texaco also claimed that a permanent
injunction, prohibiting it from future viola-
tions was inappropriate because Texaco no
longer owned the refinery, no evidence ex-
isted of irreparable injury and because the
injunction was overbroad. The court held
first that the injunction could be extended to
future owners and second that NRDC had
proven irreparable injury. The court further
ordered the case remanded for the district
court to narrow the injunction to order com-
pliance only with the parameters that were
being continuously or intermittently violated
and which had not been rendered moot by
the subsequent permit.
- by Anemarie Mura
Washington Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills,
1993 WL 492315 (9th Cir. 1993)
The Washington Public Interest Re-
search Group ("PIRG") brought a citizen suit
aga:nst Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc.
("Pendleton") for alleged permit violations.
Pendleton operates a textile mill in
Washougal, Washington at which it pro-
cesses wool. Its operations create oil, grease,
chromium, zinc and other pollutants. Pursu-
ant to its NPDES permit, Pendleton dis-
charged the waste products into the Colum-
bia River and one of its tributaries.
The EPA found that Pendleton was in
violation of its NPDES permit and ordered
Pendleton to improve its operations to com-
ply with NPDES mandates. Pendleton made
improvements, but some evidence existed
that it was still exceeding its permit limita-
tions. In December, 1990, PIRG filed suit
seeking a declaration that Pendleton was
continuing to violate its permit, as well as an
injunction for compliance and civil penalties
for violations.
Under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988), a
citizen may bring a civil action against any
person alleged to be in violation of an effluent
standard or limitation. The EPA authority to
seek administrative penalties is limited by 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (1988). That provision
ensures that administrative penalties do not
duplicate any other penalties imposed upon
the violator of the NPDES permit and pro-
vides that when the Administrator is already
prosecuting an action for a permit violation,
a civil penalty suit may not be brought by a
citizen. As a result, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit stated that the citizen suit
provision could not be invoked to seek civil
penalties when the EPA was already pursu-
ing the matter.
The court noted that 33 U.S.C. §
1319(g) (1988) requires certain procedures
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including a public notice and comment pe-
riod and a hearing in administrative penalty
actions. In issuing its compliance order, the
EPA provided none of these. The court
determined that Congress did not intend that
a compliance order constitute an administra-
tive penalty action. The court found that the
EPA's compliance order did not trigger ap-
plication of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988).
Consequently, the court held that the EPA's
compliance order did not preclude PIRG's
citizen suit.
- by Michelle Vokoun
Commonwealth v. United States
Postal Ser., 1993 WL 525044 (3d Cir.
1993)
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Environmental Resources
("DER") appealed from a district court order
granting judgment on the pleadings in favor
of defendant, United States Postal Service
("Postal Service"). The district court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the
Postal Service was not liable for civil penal-
ties for violations of state environmental
requirements because of sovereign immu-
nity. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the
district court's reasoning inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent.
In 1991, the DER filed a complaintwith
the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing
Board seeking civil penalties against the
Postal Service in connection with the con-
struction of a post office facility. The DER
claimed that the Postal Service had violated
the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law in
constructing the facility. The Postal Service
moved for judgment on the ground of sover-
eign immunity, which the district court
granted.
On appeal, the DER argued that the
"sue and be sued" provision of the Postal
Reorganization Act of 1970 ("PRA") served
as a waiver by the Postal Service of its
sovereign immunity. The DER asserted that
the Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Bd. v.
U.S. Postal Ser., 467 U.S. 512 (1984) and
Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549(1988) had
outlined exceptions to the waiver of sover-
eign immunity and that such exceptions did
not apply in the present case. The Postal
Service argued that the "sue and be sued"
provision of the PRA did not waive its sover-
eign immunity from civil penalties.
According to the appellate court, the
Postal Service was a hybrid organization.
While it retained certain attributes of a gov-
ernment operation, by design it was oper-
ated more like a business. The appellate
court held that the "sue and be sued" clause
of the PRA waived the Postal Service's
immunity from civil penalties because the
Postal Service acted as a business. The court
found that even if the PRA did not specifically
waive Postal Service immunity, 33 U.S.C. §
1323 (1988) of the Clean Water Act did.
The Postal Service argued that the "sue
and be sued" clause did not apply to civil
penalties because such penalties were not
"the natural and appropriate incidents of
legal proceedings." Commonwealth at 3,
citing Loeffler,486 U.S. at555. ThePostal
Service, however, failed to explain why civil
penalties were not the natural incidents of a
legal proceeding.
The court also distinguished between
the sovereign immunity of the government
itself and immunity of a federal instrumental-
ity that enters into a commercial business.
The court cited Loeffler, stating that a com-
mercially oriented business like the Postal
Service would not be immune unless it could
be
clearly shown that certain types
of suits are not consistent with the
statutory or constitutional scheme,
that an implied restriction of the
general authority is necessary to
avoid grave interference with the
performance of a governmental
function, or that for other reasons
it was plainly the purpose of Con-
gresstousethe'sue-and-be-sued'
clause in a narrow sense.
Commonwealth v. United States
Postal Serv., 1993 WL 525044 (3d Cir.
1993) citing Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 554.
The court found that the Postal Service met
none of these requirements and ruled that
the Postal Service had waived sovereign
immunity.
-by Kimberly Bettisworth
Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 1993 WL 517388
(2d Cir. 1993)
Atlantic States Legal Foundation ("At-
lantic") appealed from an order of the United
States District Court for the Westem District
of New York. The district court had granted
summary judgment to Eastman Kodak Com-
pany ("Kodak") and dismissed the action
brought by Atlantic States for Kodak's al-
leged violation of State Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("SPDES") permit rules.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court order.
Appellee Kodak operates an industrial
facility in Rochester, New York, that dis-
charges waste water into the Genesee River
and Paddy Hill Creek under a SPDES per-
mit. Kodak operates the facility to purify
waste produced in the manufacture of pho-
tographic supplies and other laboratory
chemicals.
Atlantic originally brought suit against
Kodak claiming that Kodak discharged pol-
lutants not covered by its permit and ex-
ceeded the effluent limits imposed by its
permit. Atlantic brought its action under the
"citizen suit" provision of the CWA. Atlantic
requested a declaratory judgment as to the
above violations, an injunction against future
violations and several other remedies, in-
cluding civil penalties of $25,000 per day of
violation, for each violation.
Atlantic argued that no pollutant not
listed in Kodak's permit could be discharged
by Kodak. Kodak, however, claimed that it
was not prohibited from discharging pollut-
ants not specifically assigned effluent limita-
tions in a NPDES or SPDES permit. Kodak
also claimed that if the permit did prohibit
discharge of the pollutants that Kodak had
released, then such a prohibition would be
broader than that of the NPDES program
that allowed Atlantic to bring a citizen suit
against Kodak.
The district court granted Kodak's
motion forsummaryjudgmentonthegrounds
listed above and dismissed the case. Atlantic
appealed from that judgment.
Theappellate courtagreed with Kodak's
argument that the permits allowed polluters
to discharge pollutants not specifically listed
in their permits so long as they followed the
reporting rules and any new limitations im-
posed upon such pollutants.
Atlantic also argued that Kodak's dis-
charge of certain pollutants violated New
York regulations regarding the permits. The
appellate court, however, held that such
state regulations could not be enforced
through citizen suits. For the reasons listed
above, the appellate court affirmed the dis-
trict court's order granting summary judg-
ment to Kodak and dismissed the case.
- by Kimberly Bettisworth
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Ciba-Geigy Corp., et al. v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, 3 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1993)
Ciba-Geigy Corporation ("Ciba"),
brought suit against the EPA to challenge the
authority of the EPA to issue federal hazard-
ous waste site permits in states that have
authority to issue their own permits under
the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments ("HSWA") to the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). Under the
original RCRA the EPA could delegate its
powers of issuing permits to the states upon
approval of their program by the EPA Ad-
ministrator. The HSWA were added to the
RCRA to deal with past mismanagement of
hazardous wastes. The HSWA required that
permits issued to plants with existing hazard-
ous waste problems also provide plans for
cleanup of these waste problems. States
which had permit programs created before
the adoption of the HSWA must affirma-
tively adopt the HSWA regulations and ob-
tain authorization from the EPA for their
HSWA programs. If a state has RCRA
authorization but not HSWA authorization,
then a permit applicant must get permits
from both the state and the EPA in order to
operate a hazardous waste site.
In this case, the New York Department
of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") had
both RCRA and HSWA authorization for its
hazardous waste programs as evidenced by
a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") be-
tween the EPA and DEC. This MOA pro-
videdthatpendingpermitapplicationswould
be transferred to the DEC, but any existing
federal permits would continue to be admin-
istered by the EPA.
Ciba ran a paint pigment production
site in New York which produced hazardous
waste. Ciba decided to close the facility, so
it applied to the New York Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC) for a
hazardous waste permit.
This application was processed before
DEC had HSWA authority; thus, both the
EPA and DEC were required to issue per-
mits. Ciba opposed the EPA's issuance of its
permit, but the EPA contended that issuing
the EPA permit was necessary because the
DEC permit would not cover all of the
requirements for the management of a haz-.
ardous waste site.
Ciba first sought review of the EPA
permit from the EPA Administrator who
consequently upheld the permit Ciba then
appealed to the Environmental Appeals
Board ("EAB"). Ciba argued that the federal
permitwasunnecessarybecauseitwas nearly
identical to the state permit. Ciba also
argued that in order for a federal permit to be
issued it had to contain an "automatic termi-
nation provision" upon state authorization
to administer HSWA regulations. The EAB
concluded that before a state had HSWA
authorization an EPA permit was required
even if the EPA permit was "substantially
similar" to the state's program. The EAB
also held that federal permits issued in con-
junction with state permits were not required
to have automatic termination provisions.
Such provisions could be resolved in the
MOA. Subsequently, the federal permit
became effective two weeks before the DEC
obtained its authorization for its HSWA pro-
gram. The final authorization of the DEC
program prompted Ciba to again challenge
the federal permit. The EPA indicated that
a federal permit for Ciba's facility would
probably still be necessary because DEC did
not have total authorization to administer all
of the HSWA requirements.
The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit first examined whether Ciba had
exhausted its administrative remedies. The
court concluded that Ciba had exhausted its
remedies as to the EAB's decision regarding
the status of the federal and state permits, but
held that Ciba had not exhausted its admin-
istrative remedies as to the Regional
Administrator's decision not to terminate the
federal permit. Section 42 U.S.C. §
6976(b)(1) (1988) allows appellate court re-
view of "administrator's actions" which in-
cludes the EAB but not the Regional Admin-
istrator. In addition, the EPA has set forth its
own rules regarding the exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies before judicial review
is allowed, one of which provides for admin-
istrative review by an Administrator follow-
ing a Regional Administrator's decision.
Thecourtnextaddressedwhether Ciba's
challenges to the federal permit were ripe for
review. Concluding that the permitting deci-
sion was ripe for review, the court found that
without judicial determination Cba would
face difficulties complying with the proce-
dural requirements of both statutes. The
court further held that Ciba had standing to
challenge the MOA on the basis that the
agreement- did not contain an automatic
termination provision for the federal permit
since RCRA authorizes "any interested per-
son" to bring suit against an EPA- action
regarding RCRA authorization.
Finally, the court looked to the merits of
Ciba's challenge to the absence of a termina-
tion clause in the MOA. Concluding that the
MOA is not required to contain an automatic
termination provision upon state authoriza-
tion, the court looked to several factors.
First, the court found that judicial estoppel
had no effect upon the requirement of such
a provision in the MOA.
Next, Ciba argued that the EPA's posi-
tion ran afoul of 40 C.F.R. § 271.8(b)(6).
That regulation provides that the MOA shall
specify procedures for the transfer of permits
from the EPA to state administration. Ciba
argued that this regulation required the EPA
to include termination provisions in federal
permits and to terminate federal permits
upon state authorization. The court rejected
the argument that 40 C.F.R. § 271.8(b)(6)
required a termination provision since the
regulation does not govem what provisions
a permit must contain. The court concluded
that nothing in the statute provides for such
a provision. Accordingly, the court held that
the EPA's refusal to include a termination
provision in the MOA was reasonable in light
of the overall purposes of RCRA and HSWA.
-by V. Alyse Hakami
U.S. v. Laughlin, 1993 WL 495765 (2d
Cir. 1993)
The owner of a railroad tie treating
business was convicted of knowingly dispos-
ing of hazardous waste without a permit in
violation of both RCRA and CERCLA. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the conviction.
Defendant Goldman owned a railroad
tie treating business, which placed untreated
green ties in a large cylinder and then added
creosote. Through a heating process, the
creosote penetrated the ties. The excess
creosote, along with water and wood alcohol
from the ties, vaporized in the cylinder. The
vaporous mixture was drawn off and run
through condensation coils, which sepa-
rated the creosote sludge for reuse in the
treatment process. The creosote sludge is a
hazardous waste as defined by RCRA.
As problems with this process devel-
oped, thesludge became contaminated. The
contaminated sludge was soaked up with
sawdust and dumped in remote areas of the
company's property. The company never
applied for a RCRA treatment, storage, or
disposal permit. As a result, no regulatory
agency was aware that the company was
handling such waste.
After a major spill of creosote, the New





Conservation began visiting the company.
Shortly thereafter, the company ran out of
room to store the sludge/water mixture, a
problem created when the company boiler
ceased to function. Goldman ordered the
excess to be stored in a railroad car. When
that became too full, defendant Laughlin, the
Vice President of Operations and Plant Man-
ager, dumped the mix onto the ground, and
covered it with rock and gravel.
During the trial, Goldman testified that
he knew the company did not have a permit
to dispose of hazardous waste; he also knew
one was required by the government. He
also testified that he knew it was illegal to
dump creosote on the ground, and that he
never reported the dumping.
Goldman claimed the court erred by
improperly instructing the jury as to the
elements of both the RCRA violation and the
CERCLA violation. He claimed that the
government was required to prove that he
was aware of the RCRA regulations appli-
cable to creosote sludge, among other ele-
ments. Goldman also claimed that the court
was required to instruct the jury that the
government must prove that, as an element
of the CERCLA offense, Goldman knew that
his release of creosote sludge violated
CERCLA. The court of appeals in affirming
the convictions, held that when knowledge is
an element of a statute intended to regulate
hazardous substances, the knowledge ele-
ment is satisfied upon a showing that a
defendant was aware he was performing
proscribed acts; knowledge of the actual
regulatory requirements is not necessary.
- by Jason Johnson
United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071 (10th
Cir. 1993)
The defendant Self, was the owner and
president of a hazardous waste recycling
facility called "Ekotek." Representatives of
Ekotek transported and handled natural gas
pipeline condensate produced by the South-
ern California Gas Company ("SGOC") pur-
suant to a Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act ("RCRA") permit. Ekotek indi-
cated that it would dispose of the natural gas
condensate by burning it as fuel in Ekotek's
onsite process heaters and boilers.
Instead, Self instructed the transporter
to leave the trailers containing the natural gas
condensate at a gas station that Self owned.
Self then had the gas station manager mix
the natural gas condensate with the gasoline
it sold to the public. The mixture contained
from five to ten percent natural gas conden-
sate and was sold to the public. Self further
instructed the manager to falsify Ekotek's
operating log to show that Ekotek had actu-
ally received the shipment of pollutants.
Ekotek also began receiving 55 gallon
drums containing a mixture of ultraviolet
curer ink waste, solvent ink waste and clean-
ing solvent. The solvent ink waste had a flash
point well below 140 degrees Fahrenheit
and according to EPA guidelines was consid-
ered hazardous due to its ignitability.
Ekotek used two warehouses to store
the drums, even though its RCRA permit
authorized storage in only one of the ware-
houses. Self ordered the warehouse super-
visor to scrape hazardous waste label off of
each drum, paint a number on each drum
and list it on an inventory sheet.
Self was charged and convicted on four
counts of violating RCRA, one count of mail
fraud, and one count each of conspiracy to
violate RCRA, the Clean Air Act and the
Clean Water Act.
Self claimed that the natural gas con-
densate was exempted from regulation be-
cause it was a "recyclable material." The
court considered whether natural gas con-
densate could be classified as a "solid waste"
as required for it to be the subject of RCRA
regulation. Under RCRA, only certain listed
commercial chemical products were consid-
ered solid wastes when burned to recover
energy. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit found that because natural gas con-
densate was not listed, it was not subject to
RCRA regulation.
The court also found that whether the
natural gas condensate could be considered
hazardous waste depended upon how it was
ultimately disposed. The regulatory authori-
ties did not know for certain that the conden-
sate would be burned for energy recovery.
The court determined that the condensate
was not a hazardous waste. As a result, the
court overturned Self's conviction of one of
the counts of RCRA violation.
As for the storage of the drums contain-
ing the ink solvent mixture, the United States
claimed that 42 U.S.C. § 6928(dX2XB) (1988)
controlled. That section prohibits "know-
ingly ... storing ... hazardous wastes ... in
knowing violation of any material condition
or requirement of [a RCRA] permit." Self
asserted that the United States had not
proved that the material in the drums was
hazardous. The court, however, found the
evidence sufficient to prove that the material
was in fact hazardous. The court also found
that Ekotek knowingly violated its RCRA
permit by storing the waste in more than one
warehouse. The court consequently upheld
the remaining convictions for RCRA viola-
tions.
- by Jason Johnson
Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Technolo-
gies Indus., 9 F.3d 1174 (6th Cir. 1993)
Greenpeace and others sought to en-
join Waste Technologies Industries ("WTI")
from continuing to operate its hazardous
waste storage and treatment plant located in
East Liverpool, Ohio. The district court for
the Northern District of Ohio entered an
order enjoining WTI from operation until the
EPA determined the plant's safety. WTI
appealed the decision.
On review, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit cited numerous occasions, be-
ginning in 1983, in which Greenpeace failed
to voice its concerns over the EPA's grant of
an operating permit to WTI, despite several
public comment periods and hearing.
Greenpeace did not participate in any of
those hearings and did not appeal any per-
mits granted to WTI subsequent to the hear-
ings.
Greenpeace filed its first complaint in
1993, immediately before WTI was to con-
duct an eight day trial bum before the permit
would be granted. Greenpeace filed suit
under the citizen suit provision of RCRA,
complaining that operation of the facility
would pose an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health and the environ-
ment and that operating the facility would
constitute a public nuisance.
The district court denied Greenpeace's
request to enjoin the trial bum but did enjoin
operation of the facility following the bum.
WTI appealed the decision and was granted
an emergency stay of the court's order.
Greenpeace's applications to vacate the stay
were denied. WTI conducted its trial bum
and resumed operation of the facility after
the burn.
The district court claimed subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under the citizen suit provi-
sions of RCRA to determine whether dioxin
levels from the trial bum period substantially
endangered the environment. The district
court stated that even if WTI had obtained an
EPA approved permit, the bum could still
harm the environment.
The court of appeals, however, re-
jected the district court's reasoning. The
appellate court found that citizen suit provi-
sions did not apply to facilities operating
within the limits of RCRA permits. Accord-
ing to the appellate court, Greenpeace's
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petition constituted an improper collateral
attack on the EPA's decision to allow such
bums.
The court also stated that even if citizen
suits were proper in this case, the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1988) allowed
judicial review of RCRA permits by circuit
courts of appeals, not by federal district
courts. The court noted that 42 U.S.C. §
6972(b)(2)(D) (1988) states that citizens may
not commence suits "with respect to the
citing of a hazardous waste...disposal facility,
nor to restrain or enjoin the issuance of a
permit for such facility." The court found
that decisions of the EPA regarding the grant
of permits should be appealed only to the
circuit courts of appeals, which has excusive
jurisdiction in such matters.
The court also rejected Greenpeace's
argument that it could attack the permit in
district court if operation of the facility immi-
nently and substantially endangered to the
environment, despite compliance with the
permit. The court noted that such interpre-
tation would nullify the requirement that
EPA-issued permits must be appealed to an
EPA administrator before review by the ap-
propriate circuit court of appeals.
The court concluded that because
Greenpeace did not bring its complaint in the
appropriate court within 90 days of the
issuance of the permit to Wl as required by
RCRA, it lost its opportunity to oppose
operation of the facility, and dismissed the
complaint.
MISSOURI
City of Jefferson v. Missouri Dep't of
Natural Resources, 863 S.W.2d 844
(Mo. banc 1993)
The appellants include Jefferson City,
St. Joseph, Eldon and Buchanan County.
The appellants challenged that Senate Bill
530 ("S.B. 530"), passed in 1990, violated
Article III, § 39(10); Article VI, §§ 16, 19 and
19(a) and Article X, §§ 10(a) and 21 of the
Missouri Constitution. The respondent,
Missouri Department of Natural Resources,
moved for summary judgment, which was
granted by the trial courL Appellants appeal
the trial court's judgment.
Section 260.305.1 of the Missouri Re-
vised Statutes authorizes the creation of solid
waste management districts and § 260.305.3
directs how cities and counties may form
these districts. Section 260.3 10.2 states that
a solid waste management district may con-
tract with any city or county in that district to
provide solid waste management services for
that city or county. If the city or county has
given the district the authority to manage all
of its solid waste, then the city or county need
not file its own solid waste management
plan. Counties and cities over 500 persons
that choose not be members of a solid waste
management district must submit a solid
waste management plan within 180 days of
their decision not to join a district.
Appellants argued that these statutes
violate Article X, § 21 of the Missouri Con-
stitution which provides that a new service or
increase in service "beyond that required by
existing law shall not be required by the
General Assembly or any state agency. .
.unless a state appropriation is made and
disbursed to pay the county or other political
subdivision for increased costs." Appellants
argue first that S.B. 530 requires that they
finance a solid waste management district if
the county in which the city resides decides
to join a district Second, appellants claim
that if the county fails to join a district, they
must file a solid waste management plan that
is more extensive than previously mandated
by law.
Appellants stated thatS.B. 530 impliedly
requires that a municipality join a district if
the county in which the municipality is lo-
cated is a member of a district. Appellants
support this inference with § 260.305.3
which provides that a city located in more
than one county may join a district which any
one of the counties has joined. Appellants
argued that this section implies that a city
located in only one county must join a district
if the county does so. Appellants also cite
§ 260.325.8, which requires a city to with-
draw from a district if the county where it is
located withdraws.
The court found that the statutes were
unclear and subject to the inferences which
appellants drew. The court also noted,
however, that the statutes may be inter-
preted to read that no mandate exists regard-
ing municipality membership in a district.
The court consequently held that S.B. 530
does not require that a city join a solid waste
management district; a city may join only if it
chooses to.
Appellants also argued that S.B. 530
requires them to file a new solid waste
management plan that conforms to
§ 260.325. Filing this plan, appellants
claimed, would result in additional costs
beyond those incurred under previous re-
quirements. Because the respondents had
failed to address this issue in their motion for
summary judgment, the court reversed on
that issue and remanded for further proceed-
ings.
Appellants also asserted that § 260.305
violated Article VI, § 16 which provides that
a municipality may contract or cooperate
with other municipalities and political subdi-
visions for the planning or operation of any
public improvement. Appellants argued that
§ 260.305 limited its right to contract with
any political subdivision of the state that it
chooses. The court noted that if a municipal-
ity did not want to contract or cooperate with
a particular subdivision, then it could choose
not to join the district; therefore, the legisla-
tive limitation did not violate the Missouri
Constitution.
Finally, appellants Jefferson City and
St. Joseph claimed that S.B. 530 violated
Article VI, § 19(a) which grants charter cities
all powers that the General Assembly con-
fers upon those cities, and such powers are
not limited or denied by the charter. The
cities argue that S.B. 530 creates a separate
level of govemment which may limit or deny
charter cities the authority granted to them in
the Constitution. The court denied this point
for two reasons. First, S.B. 530 does not
require charter cities to join a district; there-
fore, their powers are not deprived. Second,
any conflicts between a charter city's power
and a state statute are to be resolved in favor
of the statute.
- by Christine Hymes






As a result of action taken in 20 bank-
ruptcy cases, the Attorney General's Envi-
ronmental Protection Division has gained
$2.2 million to protect Missouri's environ-
ment this year.
Approximately $2 million comes from
agreements by companies to pay cleanup
costs which the state would have incurred but
for the Attorney General's action. The
remaining $200,000 represents actual re-
coveries by the state.
These savings and recoveries result
from Nixon's new effort to prevent compa-
nies from declaring bankruptcy to avoid
fines, penalties and environmental cleanups.
With help from the state's Department of
Natural Resources, Nixon has developed a
process to determine whether companies
declaring bankruptcy have met their envi-
ronmental duties.
According to Nixon, most of the bank-
ruptcy claims involved the failure of site
owners, lessees and operators to cleanup
and properly close underground storage
tanks.
ST. LOUIS CONTRACTOR PLEADS
GUILTY TO POLLUTING CREEK
Steven Smith, owner of Atlas Excavat-
ing, pleaded guilty to criminal misdemeanor
charges for dumping 17,600 pounds of
concrete into Deer Creek in Webster Groves.
Smith incurred a $2,500 fine and two years'
probation and was ordered to cleanup the
site.
A resident who saw Smith back his
truck into the creek bank and dump the
concrete into the creek immediately called
the Webster Groves Police Department A
police officer arrested Smith at the scene.
BRANSON DEVELOPER ORDERED
TO STOP SELLING HOMES UNTIL
WATER AND SEWER LINES ARE
REPAIRED
International Real Properties of Mis-
souri, Inc., (IRP) a real estate developer, has
been ordered to cease its operations until it
builds water and sewer lines in Branson West
Highlands, a subdivision in Branson West.
Attorney General Jay Nixon sued
IRP for violations of Missouri's Safe Drinking
Water Law. IRP admitted it constructed a
public drinking system without permission of
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR).
IRP also allegedly installed inferior sewer
lines without DNR approval.
IRP allegedly failed to install water lines
at least 10 feet from sewer lines. Italsofailed
to lay water lines on a gravel bed at least six
inches deep and did not place sewer lines in
a straight line.
The Stone County Circuit Court has
prohibited IRP from connecting homes in
Branson West Highlands to the public drink-
ing or sewer system until IRP abandons the
existing sewer system and obtains a permit
from DNR to install new water and sewer
systems.
AMOCO TO PAY $1 MILLON FOR
OIL SPILL
Amoco Pipe Line Co. will pay a $1
million settlement for a 1990 pipeline explo-
sion in Macon County that released 86,000
gallons of oil into the LittleTurkey Creek and
Chariton River.
The rupture of pressurized oil cut a 20-
foot-long ditch into the ground and covered
trees 50 feet high, standing 1,000 feet from
the pipeline. The black crude oil spilled over
30 miles of Missouri waterways, killing nearly
6,000 organisms, including fish, frogs, birds
and mammals.
In addition, Amoco will indemnify the
Department of Natural Resources forcleanup
costs. The DNR has spent more than
$277,000 inspecting the damages, oversee-
ing Amoco's cleanup and finding ways to
protect the environment long-term.
Macon County Circuit Court ordered
Amoco to remove all oil from the affected
areas, ensure that groundwater meets drink-
ing water standards and take responsibility
for future contaminations of groundwater
resulting from the oil spill.
Through cleanup efforts, mostof the oil
has been removed from the ground and
water. Amoco is still treating contaminated
groundwater.
The agreement provides that Amoco
will pay $900,000 to the Natural Resources
Protection Fund for environmental dam-
ages. Amoco will also pay $100,000 in
penalties to be divided between Chariton
and Macon county school funds. Missouri
statutes created these funds to maintain and
improve resources like those damaged.
The explosion occurred as Amoco was
dosing the pipeline which extends 156 miles
from La Plata in Macon County to central
Cass County.
MOBERIY RAILWAY COMPANY TO
PAY $3.4 MILLION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL SETTLEMENT.
Norfolk and Western Railway Co. has
paid $700,000 in civil penalties and dam-
ages and will pay an additional $2.7 million
to the state for improperly disposing of at
least 500 containers of waste paint at its
railroad yard in Moberly. The paint is consid-
ered hazardous because of its ignitability.
The DNR discovered that paint, sol-
vents and other waste had been buried in
April 1989 in a trench two feet wide, 20 feet
deep and 50 feet long. The DNR uncovered
20 five-gallon and 540 one-gallon paint
containers and one 55-gallon container of
solvent and other waste.
Attorney General JayNixon, along with
Edward L Dowd Jr., U.S. Attorney for the
Eastern District of Missouri, sought civil and
criminal penalties against the railway com-
pany. The company agreed to a settlement
which included payment of $350,000 to
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Randolph County School Fund and
$350,000 to the Natural Resources Protec-
tion Fund and cleanup the railroad yard to
comply with hazardous waste laws.
The company must also pay a criminal
penalty of $1 million to the Missouri State
Parks Earnings Fund to benefit Katy Trail
Park. In addition, it must buy the state $1.7
million worth of equipment and materials
used to investigate environmental violations.
The company must also develop and imple-
ment an environmental awareness program
for its employees.
The criminal plea also requires the
company to pay a $500,000 fine plus an-
other $500,000 to the United States for its
costsanddamages. Dowdhasrecommended
that $300,000 of thefinebe eliminated once
the company has fully cleaned up the site and
complies with environmental laws and regu-
lations.
NIXON OBTAINS INJUNCTION
AGAINST ILLEGAL TIRE DUMPING
Attorney General Jay Nixon obtained a
court order requiring DWM of Mid-America
Inc. to store 2 million tires according to state
environmental laws and national fire protec-
tion regulations or else remove the tires from
the Polk County property.
Nixon alleged that DWM illegally stored
tires without a permit and violated fire pro-
tection regulations and runoff protection
requirements. Someofthetiresweredumped
in standing water.
Polk County Circuit Judge Theodore
B. Scott ordered DWM to stop storing solid
waste on its property, dispose of the tires
according to state environmental laws and
remove all tires from water. DWM must
additionally pay a $2,000 civil penalty to
Polk County School Fund and penalties up
to $5,000 per day if it fails to complywith the
consent order. The company either can
remove all the tires within 180 days or
properly cut and bail the tires for storage.
WEST PLAINS COMPANY TO PAY
HAZARDOUS WASTE PENALTIES
A West Plains furniture manufacturer
will pay $18,000 in civil penalties for pro-
ducing waste solvents and contaminating soil
in violation of environmental laws.
Amyx Manufacturing Limited Partner-
ship, which manufactures oak furniture, cre-
ated and improperly stored and dumped
hazardous waste solvents without permis-
sion of the Department of Natural Resources.
The company dumped the solvents behind
its factory, polluting the soil along a railroad
track. Nixon also accused the company of
having an inadequate emergency prepared-
ness plan.
Amyx officials said they did not know
thewaste was hazardous. Amyx was notified
of the violations in April 1990 and has since
remediated the contaminated soil.
In the settlement, Amyx agreed to
comply with Missouri's Hazardous Waste
Management Law and pay a $17,920 civil
penalty to the Howell County School Fund.
TWO OZARK COMPANIES TO PAY
HAZARDOUS WASTE PENALTIES
Attorney General Jay Nixon has ob-
tained settlements of more than $40,000
from two Lake of the Ozark companies
accused of violatingstateenvironmentallaws.
Amusement Equipment Manufacturer
Ltd., an Edon company that produces and
repairs amusement park ride equipment also
agreed to implement hazardous waste emer-
gency plans. The other company, Lake
Ozark Construction Industries, Inc., agreed
to use hazardous waste, monitoring equip-
ment.
Amusement Equipment Manufacturers
allegedly failed to label, date and properly
dose containers of hazardous waste. The
company also failed to post "No Smoking"
signs, test emergency sprinklers and send
updated emergency plans to local emer-
gency agencies; and did not properly train its
employees. The company also neglected to
us licensed hazardous waste transporters
and use authorized treatment, storage and
disposal facilities.
Amusement Equipment Manufacturers
agreed to pay $23,140 to the Miller County
School Fund, submit to emergency agencies
an emergency contingency plan within 30
days detailing how it would handle hazard-
ous waste and test its sprinkler system.
Lake Ozark Construction, allegedly had
violated the Missouri Air Conservation Law
at its Linn Creek and Osage Beach facilities
for two years. The company is accused of
exceeding its pennitted production limits,
failing to keep production records on site and
operating without proper permits of pollu-
tion-monitoring equipment
Lake Ozark Construction has agreed to
pay $9,000 to each of the Camden and
Miller county school funds and $12,000 in
suspended penalties for future violations.
The company will also begin to use equip-
ment to monitor pollution and will install
water spray controls. For each day it fails to





The Vernon County Consolidated Pub-
lic Water Supply District No. 1 will pay a
$12,000 penalty for allegedly failing to ob-
tain construction permits before drilling a
well and creating a public water system.
A well, water tower and pipeline were
constructed before the DNR issued violation
notices to the district. Despite such notices,
the company continued construction.
In addition to a $12,000 penalty to be
paid to the Vernon County School Fund, the
water supply district agreed to stop construc-
tion until a permit is issued, issue notices that
the well has not been approved and the
water may not meet drinking water stan-
dards, submit to DNR engineering reports,
plans and specifications to obtain a permit.
The district must also drill holes around the
system so that the pipeline might be in-
spected, have the water tested for bacteria
and other contaminants and correct any
problems in its distribution and treatment
facilities to ensure that the system complies
with environmental laws.
The state is entitled to request addi-
tional court-imposed penalties if the district
fails to comply with the consent order.
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Attorney General Enforcement Actions
EDITORS' PERSPECTIVE
THE EinoNMENAm AuDIT PRIVILEGE BENEFITs ALL SIDES
Within the past two years, four states (Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, and Oregon) have passed laws which create a privilege
for environmental audits. Several morestates, includingArizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia, have similar laws in various stages of the legislative process.
In Missouri, regulators, representatives of the regulated community, and members of environmental groups have come
together to form the Environmental AuditPrivilege Working Group, which isin the process of reviewing a draft of a Missouri
environmental audit privilege act for potential proposal to the Missouri legislature. A clash between federal and state
policymakers, however, threatens the utility of the environmental audit privilege in the stateswhich have it or are considering
adoptingit
The EPA's policy on environmental auditing was initially set forth in 1986 and was reaffirmed without change in July,
1994. While EPA encourages environmental auditing, it does not recognize the application of a privilege to audits.
Furthermore, EPA opposes the approach taken by the states, citing the risk of less effective and less efficient state enforcement,
and an increased enforcement burden on EPA's scarce resources. EPA's fears are overstated.
An environmental audit privilege recognized by both state and federal agencies would have many benefits. Allowing
companies to conduct audits for the purpose of determining whether they are in compliancewith environmental laws without
fearthatthe results will be used against them in an enforcementaction could shift much of the cost for enforcing compliance
from governmentto the regulated community. Additionally, theprivilege would promote the early identification and correction
of violations. A disincentive to investigation currently exists, especially where automatic penalties are in place for
noncompliance. There is little reason foracompany to conduct avoluntary compliance auditor report violations under such
a policy. A privilegewould increase compliance rates by removing this disincentive. Furthermore, detailed audits may disclose
violations thata regulatory inspection would miss, thus identifying problems which could escalate with the passage of time.
Most existing and proposed state and federal legislation regarding an environmental audit privilege has adequate
safeguards to protectagainstthe abuse ofthe privilege. Forinstance, all thepieces of legislation contain language that provides
that the privilege is lost if itis asserted for a fraudulent purpose. Furthermore, nearly all the legislation requires the party
conducting the audit to make a prompt, good-faith effortto remedy non-compliance in order to retain theprivilege. Another
typical saeguardallows use ofthe auditin a criminal proceeding under certain circumstances. Provisions concerning waiver
of the privilege and assignmentof the burden of proof also shouldtend to preventmisuse of the privilege. Some legislation
even contains asunset clause which would require a re-evaluation of the privilege after a few years. This is an excellent way
to allay the concerns of officials responsible for enforcement while giving the regulated community an opportunity to
demonstrate how the environmental audit privilege can bring about a cost-effective increase in compliance rates.
Existing EPA policy is hindering state efforts to implement this cost-effective tool for increasing compliance. EPA's
opposition to the state privilege on the basis of increased expenditure of its resources is merelyapreface to EPA's overtthreat
to"overfile" onstate enforcementactions, which could circumventthe state-recognized privilege. Moreover, EPA'sstanding
offerto reward companies which conductcompliance audits by consideringthe auditsas amitigating factor during enforcement
responses has been met with industry skepticism. Such a promise does not reach the level of certainty necessary for the
regulated community to participate involuntary compliance audits.
EPA should reconsider its current policy concerning the environmental audit privilege. In the alternative, or perhaps
preferably, Congress should circumventEPA's unwillingness to recognizethe privilege bypassinglegislation creatingafederal
environmental audit privilege. The climate in Congress seems receptive, considering that arecentvoice vote on an amendment
in the Senate encouraged EPA to recognize the privilege, and that Senator Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Ore) is circulating a federal
bill similar to his state's law which may be proposed in the near future. I hope that Congress and the Missouri Legislature
will considerthe value of the environmental auditprivilege. The interests of companies, state and federal agencies, and the
environment could all be served by awell-drafted environmental audit privilege.
I invite our readers to submit articles and opinion pieces regarding the desirability of an environmental audit
privilege at a federal level and in Missouri. The Missounm ENymooirAL LAW & Poucv REVIEW encourages all points
of view on this important issue which demands the immediate attention of anyone who wishes to have a voice in the
ensuing policy debate.
Theodore A. Kardis
Editor-In-Chief
